Next Step on Korea
By John F. Kerry
Wednesday, August 6, 2003; Page A17

The Bush administration's reported decision to meet again with North Korean officials looks like a positive development. But the administration's erratic handling of the North Korean nuclear crisis over the past year leaves it little room for error. It first ignored the threat because it was preoccupied with Iraq, then played it down -- thus leading Pyongyang to think we would accept a nuclear North Korea -- then proposed a dialogue, but steadfastly refused to talk directly with the North Koreans. All this served only to create confusion and put North Korea's despotic leader, Kim Jong Il, in the driver's seat. Now, finally, the administration is getting off the merry-go-round; the question is where we go from here.

It's time to lay aside the failed efforts of the past year and engage in a negotiation process that, mindful of the hard realities on the Korean peninsula, promises a comprehensive solution to the challenges we and our allies face there.

Since the end of last year, North Korea has moved quickly to restore its capacity to produce nuclear weapons. It has resumed plutonium production, reportedly begun reprocessing plutonium fuel rods, continued work to enrich uranium and withdrawn from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. A North Korea armed with nuclear weapons and a nuclear weapons production line is, as former secretary of defense William Perry argues, a "nightmare scenario."
President Bush has said that he wants a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. If the coming talks are to be more than show, however, the Bush administration must commit itself to negotiate directly with the North Koreans -- no matter who else is at the table -- and have a viable negotiating strategy. The threat posed by North Korea is too dangerous to allow someone else, be it our allies or China, to negotiate our interests.

Freezing North Korea's reprocessing activities is our most urgent need. We cannot allow North Korea to continue to build its capacity to produce bombs while we are negotiating. Ultimately, our goal is to force North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program through an internationally verifiable process. The administration's negotiating strategy must further both these objectives -- and in a way that prevents the North Koreans from extracting concessions from us absent compliance by them.

Administration officials have said precious little about an immediate freeze, preferring to focus on their oft-repeated demand that North Korea dismantle its nuclear weapons program in return for a U.N. promise not to attack. History suggests that Kim Jong Il, a paranoid dictator, is not going to do anything on U.S. demand. From the North Korean perspective, nuclear weapons are at the core of the country's security and the regime's survival. And they could provide Pyongyang with a new, lucrative source of income for its cash-strapped economy. A viable strategy for addressing this nuclear crisis must take these factors as well as U.S. and allied security needs into account. This does not mean that we pay off Kim Jong Il to dismantle his program. It means that we approach these negotiations with three basic realities firmly in mind.

First, negotiations may not succeed in resolving this crisis, but history would never forgive us if we failed to try. The military options for resolving this crisis are not today desirable -- they will be worse if North Korea has a treasure trove of nuclear weapons.

Second, Pyongyang is not going to freeze its nuclear program without some commitment from the United States that North Korea's security will not be jeopardized. A U.S. commitment not to increase its offensive capabilities on the Korean peninsula while Pyongyang is freezing its nuclear activities is one obvious -- and, I believe, viable -- way to move forward and get both parties to the negotiating table. Additionally, all parties would agree to refrain from hostilities during negotiations. But in putting such a proposal on the table, we must make clear that we retain all options, including military options, if North Korea breaks the freeze.

Third, the administration cannot resolve this crisis with a one-dimensional approach. Focusing solely on North Korea's nuclear program not only fails to address the reasons why Kim Jong Il wants nuclear weapons but also enables him to engage in nuclear brinkmanship and blackmail. We must be prepared to negotiate a comprehensive agreement that addresses the full range of issues of concern to the United States and its allies -- North Korea's nuclear, chemical and missile programs, conventional force deployment, drug running and human rights -- as well as North Korea's concerns about security and economic development. And we must clearly signal our willingness to embark upon this path. As Pyongyang met designated targets for dismantling its nuclear program, reducing conventional forces and reforming its economy, sanctions would be relaxed incrementally and technical assistance would be provided. Such an agreement must be verifiable, and phased, so that we can judge the North Koreans' compliance at every step -- and stop the clock if they fail to comply.

There is no guarantee that this crisis can be resolved diplomatically. But going to the table with a comprehensive approach based on the hard realities that confront us demonstrates a commitment to negotiation that this administration has yet to convey. It signals our allies that we are prepared to go the last mile to resolve this crisis peacefully, and, should our effort fail, it strengthens our hand -- and our credibility in the eyes of the world -- to undertake a military option.

The writer, a Democratic senator from Massachusetts, is seeking his party's presidential nomination. The Washington Post